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What is the ‘Law’ in Chinese Tax 
Administration?
Abstract
In December 2009, within just weeks of the issuance of several controversial 
(and arguably ultra vires) tax circulars by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), the SAT promulgated 
a seminal regulation governing informal rulemaking activities of all tax 
authorities in China. This regulation took effect on 1 July 2010 and promises 
to significantly improve the clarity, transparency, predictability and quality of 
rulemaking on taxation in the PRC. Ironically, it can also be seen as a rebuke 
to a cynical view that is rather prevalent among Chinese tax practitioners and 
reinforced by the recent problematic tax circulars: namely, that because the 
PRC government does not care about creating order in tax administration and 
taxpayers are unwilling or are unable to enforce their rights, informal rules 
issued by the government should be given full weight even if they contradict 
laws created by higher authority and/or are inconsistent with each other. The 
new SAT regulation on informal rulemaking is just one illustration of the 
dynamic development of the rule of law in taxation in China. This article 
uses the enactment of the new regulation as an occasion for examining the 
question: what is the ‘law’ in Chinese tax administration?
* Center for Comparative Fiscal research, China University of Political science and Law. 
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Introduction
Paradoxically, the discourse in China about the rule of law in taxation is going 
through both a primitive and a dynamic phase. The discourse is primitive in 
obvious ways. the meaning and scope of ‘law’ are not yet clear, and there is 
wide divergence between what the written rules say about this matter and actual 
practices. many taxpayers and tax professionals do not distinguish between 
official prescriptions that have the force of law and those that do not, and 
they harbour a high tolerance for inconsistencies among informal rules which 
have a purported legal effect. Litigation against tax agencies is still relatively 
rare. on the other hand, within just the last few years, the rule of law in tax 
administration has also witnessed significant progress. the sat has made 
surprising advances making procedural improvements in rulemaking, audit 
procedures, administrative appeals and other areas, heeding the state Council’s 
directives on ‘administration in accordance with the rule of law’.1 Prominent 
public criticisms of the lack of rule of law in taxation are heard with greater 
frequency. Finally, China’s attempt to curb real or alleged international tax 
avoidance is rapidly drawing international attention and fuelling rule of law 
concerns. 
This article aims to lay a foundation for analyses of the rule of law in Chinese 
taxation, by tackling the question, what is ‘law’ in China’s tax system? the 
answer given may be summarised as follows. The Law on Legislation2 (LL) sets 
out a system of legal norms that only recognises state Council regulations and 
ministerial regulations as having the force of law, insofar as documents issued 
by central executive branch entities are concerned.3 The judiciary has explicitly 
endorsed this view. however, this view has been largely divorced from actual 
practice, and in the realm of tax administration, only a miniscule portion of the 
moF and sat’s tax rulemaking has taken forms that would be recognised as law 
by the LL. The remaining and vast majority of moF and sat rules have, until 
recently, been barely distinguishable from government internal documents. even 
where tax authorities attempt to impose self-constraints on agency rulemaking, 
they adopt a much more expansive view of the scope of the law than do the LL 
and courts. There are thus at least three sharply diverging positions about what 
constitutes the law in tax administration:
1 see Guofa [2004] no 10, Key Points in implementing the Comprehensive Promotion of 
administration in accordance with the rule of Law (state Council, 22 march 2004).
2 Law on Legislation (national People’s Congress (nPC), adopted 15 march 2000, 
effective 1 July 2000).
3 statutes adopted by local legislatures and regulations issued by local heads of the 
executive branch also have the force of law within the relevant local jurisdictions: see 
Pt ii.a below. 
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1. the position of the LL and the judiciary;
2. the approach of the moF/sat in practice and acquiesced to by many tax 
professionals; and 
3. the sat’s ‘reformist’ view newly announced in 2010. 
This divergence is partly hidden by the paucity of civil tax litigation, which also 
means that there has been little external constraint on tax rulemaking, despite 
the tax authorities’ theoretical vulnerability in terms of the legal effectiveness of 
their pronouncements. 
Part ii of this article describes the system of legal norms laid out in the LL 
and related regulations, as well as the judicial understanding of that system 
for purposes of formal adjudication. Part iii shows how the view of the scope 
of law described in Part ii has had little bearing on rulemaking in Chinese 
taxation, and how tax administration has operated, in an important sense, 
almost entirely outside the scope of law. Part iV summarises the sat’s own 
view of the scope of tax law as expressed in a very recent regulation governing 
rulemaking procedures by tax agencies. This view differs significantly from that 
of the LL, but is nonetheless a principled view, and represents an important 
shift in tax administration. The conclusion analyses possible directions for future 
development.  
II. The System of Formal Legal Rules
A. The Law on Legislation and Related Regulations
the LL is a foundational statute in the Chinese legal framework,4 and is 
important both for its explicit provisions and as a reference point for the 
executive and judicial branches’ understanding of the law. on its face, the 
statute applies to the enactment, revision and nullification of national statutes 
(by the national legislature), ‘administrative regulations’ (by the state Council),5 
local statutes (by sub-national legislatures) and certain regulations issued by 
ethnic autonomous regions.6 it also governs, in the same manner, regulations 
4 albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (3rd ed, 
Lexisnexis, China, 2006), ch 6.
5 ‘administrative regulations’ and ‘state Council regulations’ will be used interchangeably 
in the remainder of this article.
6 LL, art 2.
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issued by ministries under the state Council and certain local governments, 
but leaves most procedural rules regarding these two types of regulations to be 
formulated by the state Council.7 While the statute does not state anywhere 
that no other type of documents issued by government entities have the force of 
law and that the rules governed by it are the exclusive sources of law, it strongly 
implies so. This is because the central purpose of the LL is to bring consistency 
and uniformity to the Chinese legal system,8 and its ability to do so would be 
severely limited if rules with the force of law are not governed and ordered by it.
The importance of the LL in delineating the formal sources of law can be 
better appreciated in light of the statute’s legislative history. The LL represented 
a major compromise between the Chinese legislative and executive branches.9 
a view of the nPC as the supreme source of law is embodied in China’s 
constitution.10 despite this constitutional framework, the nPC made sweeping 
(and vague) delegations of authority during the 1980s to the executive branch 
and the judiciary, either to interpret or to make law. Beginning with the passing 
of the administrative Litigation Law (aLL) in 1989,11 however, the nPC 
began to gradually reclaim its legislative authority, and to impose limits on 
the executive branch’s ability to make law. according to the aLL, in handling 
administrative cases, courts must take national and local statutes, as well as 
state Council regulations as the basis for making decisions.12 By contrast, 
ministerial and local governmental regulations are to be taken only ‘as references’ 
7 Ibid; see, state Council decree no 321, ordinance regarding Procedures for the 
Formulation of administrative regulations (issued 16 november 2001, effective 1 
January 2002) (‘administrative regulation-making Procedures’); state Council decree 
no 322, ordinance regarding Procedures for the Formulation of regulations (issued 16 
november 2001, effective 1 January 2002) (‘regulation-making Procedures’) . 
8 see, for example, Gu anran, explanatory remarks regarding the draft Law on 
Legislation, delivered at the nPC meeting on 9 march 2000; Guofa [2000] no 11, state 
Council notice regarding implementing the Law on Legislation (issued 8 June 2000) 
(referring to state Council regulations and ministerial and local government regulations, 
but not to other normative documents, as ‘constituent parts of the nation’s unified legal 
system’). 
9 see, for example, xu anbiao, The allocation of Legislative rights under the Law on 
Legislation; available at: http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/16900/171/2004/10/
ma0223793413101400215043_135733.htm. 
10 Constitution of the People republic of China, arts 58, 62, and 67. 
11 administrative Litigation Law (nPC, adopted 4 april 1989, effective 1 october 1990). 
The aLL governs judicial proceedings against government agencies.
12 aLL, art 52. 
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by courts.13 subsequently, during the drafting of the LL, the nPC considered 
reserving the power of statutory interpretation to the legislative branch.14 This 
attempt did not prevail and extensive delegations of legislative authority to the 
state Council were codified.15 moreover, ministerial and local governmental 
regulations are recognised as part of the formal legal order.16 nonetheless, 
despite the political dominance of the executive branch, among documents 
issued by central government ministries, the LL only included state Council and 
ministerial regulations as part of the formal legal order. in recognition of this 
special status accorded to ministerial regulations by the LL, central ministries 
including the moF and sat have consistently observed the distinction between 
regulations and documents of lesser authority,17 although regulations represent a 
miniscule portion of these agencies’ published rules.
the LL, along with several subsequent administrative regulations, also 
articulated certain features common to all rules having the force of law.
First, all rules governed by the LL cannot have a retroactive effect, with the 
exception of rules ‘formulated specially for the purpose of better protecting 
the rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organisations’.18 
This principle is affirmed in state Council ordinances regarding administrative 
regulations and ministerial regulations,19 and is also explicitly invoked in the 
sat’s own regulation regarding regulation-making procedures.20 By contrast, as 
discussed in Part ii below, at least until 2010, many circulars issued by the moF 
and the sat, whether they set out new rules or interpret existing ones, were 
applied retroactively.
13 Ibid, art 53. 
14 see Zhang Chunsheng, explanatory remarks regarding the draft Law on Legislation, 
delivered at the 12th meeting of the nPC standing Committee on 25 october 1999 
(describing a draft of the LL which would have withdrawn earlier delegations of power 
to interpret law).
15 LL, arts 8-11.
16 For further discussion, see Chen (note 4 above), ch 6.
17 see Caibanfa [2002] no 68, opinions of the ministry of Finance on the implementation 
of the Law in Legislation (moF General office, issued 4 december 2000) (laying out 
conditions for making moF regulations); sat decree no 1, implementation measures 
for regulation-making by tax agencies (adopted 1 February 2002, effective 1 march 
2002).
18 LL, art 84.
19 administrative regulation-making Procedures, art 29; regulation-making Procedures, 
art 32. see also Guo Fahan [2002] no 134, notice regarding strict implementation of 
article 32 of the ordinance regarding Procedures for the Formulation of regulations 
(state Council Legislative affairs office, issued 14 may 2002).
20 see implementation measures for regulation-making by tax agencies (note 17 above), 
art 3.
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second, the solicitation for public input is a requirement for formal legal 
rules, especially those made by the executive branch. There is no clear criterion 
for what constitutes sufficient solicitation, let alone a sufficient response to input 
received. The failure to engage in such solicitation is, in any case, not considered 
actionable under the aLL.21 nonetheless, the recommendation for solicitation 
of public input is consistently applied to all administrative and ministerial 
regulations,22 while it is not regarded as relevant for rulings and announcements 
with lesser authority. moreover, as of 2010, the state Council does require the 
publication of all draft state Council and ministerial regulations unless there is a 
legal requirement that they be kept confidential.23
third, formal rules of law are characterised by extensive procedures for 
their adoption. While the LL itself lays out such procedures for national and 
local statutes, the state Council has stipulated procedures for the adoption of 
regulations.24 two features of such procedures are perhaps most telling. the 
first is that for regulations even to be proposed internally, the rules they contain 
must already be ‘mature’.25 there is no mechanism for issuing temporary or 
trial regulations, and, in practice, trial measures tend to be issued in formats 
with lesser authority than regulations.26 the second is that regulations must 
be reviewed and approved by the highest relevant body within the regulation-
21 see Fa [1991] no 19(Provisional) opinions regarding Certain issues in the 
implementation of the administrative Litigation Law (supreme People’s Court, issued 
11 June 1991), s 1(1) (‘specific administrative actions’ that are actionable must be 
directed at specific persons). 
22 administrative regulation-making Procedures, arts 12, 19-22; regulation-making 
Procedures, arts 14, 15, 20-23.
23 Guobanfa [2010] no 3, notice regarding the Printing of the state Council’s Legislation 
Work Plan for 2010 (state Council General office, issued 1 January 2010).
24 see, generally, administrative regulation-making Procedures and regulation-making 
Procedures.
25 see administrative regulation-making Procedures art 8; regulation-making Procedures, 
art 19.
26 Compare, for example, Guoshuifa [2005] no 201, administrative measures for 
Formulating normative documents in taxation (for trial implementation) (sat, 
effective 1 march 2006, repealed 1 July 2010) (‘trial measures for normative 
documents’, adopting the format of an informal rule), and the administrative measures 
for Formulating normative documents in taxation decree no 20 (sat, effective 1 July 
2010) (‘new measures for normative documents’, a formal regulation), both of which 
are discussed in Pt iV below.
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making agency, and signed by the head of the agency.27 Just as the requirement 
for public comment solicitation may deter the issuance of formal regulations in 
other countries, in China it is this internal political process that prevents many 
regulations from being proposed in the first place.
Finally, all rules with the force of law may be challenged as being inconsistent 
with rules of higher authority through non-judicial procedures. Citizens may 
apply for review by the nPC standing Committee of potentially invalid 
administrative regulations,28 and by the state Council of potentially invalid 
ministerial regulations.29 although these rights have been rarely exercised, they 
are nonetheless conceptually important. This is because the Chinese judiciary is 
generally regarded as having no power to invalidate statutes and regulations.30 
Because these rules are generally legally binding, their validity must therefore be 
challengeable through other channels. Conversely, if certain rules issued by the 
government are not considered legally binding, there is arguably less need for 
non-judicial procedures for invalidating them. Courts may simply disregard such 
rules if they are inconsistent with higher law. 
these four features of formal legal rules demonstrate that the conception 
of what rules have legal effect in the Chinese legal system is not arbitrary.31 
rather, it reflects a fundamental view about what characteristics rules deserving 
to be called the law must display: legal rules can be made (and repealed) only 
by the entities and persons with the authority to do so; they cannot be applied 
retroactively to the detriment of the persons subject to them and they should 
ideally be made pursuant to some process of public participation.
B. Judicial Views of Rules with Formal Effect of Law
as discussed above, the aLL was an important precursor of the LL in curbing 
the executive branch’s ability to make law. the aLL does not of itself state 
that any effect should be given to government pronouncements of lesser status 
27 in the case of state Council regulations, this means the standing Committee of the state 
Council and the Premier, respectively; administrative regulation-making Procedures, 
arts 26 and 27. For ministerial regulations, this means a ministerial committee and the 
minister, respectively; regulation-making Procedures, arts 27 and 29.
28 LL, art 90. 
29 regulation-making Procedures, art 35.
30 Lawmaking power is, in theory, reserved to the legislative branch and executive branch 
entities to which such power has been delegated. see Jie Cheng, ‘Constitutional 
reflections on Judicial interrogatories’ (2007) 4 Faxuejia 122 at 129. 
31 The publication of rules intended to have the effect of law is another notable feature 
common to all such rules.
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than regulations. in a seminal document summarising discussions at a national 
judicial conference held in shanghai in 2003 (‘shanghai meeting minutes’),32 
the supreme People’s Court (sPC) distinguished formal regulations from 
‘interpretations for specific application’ as well as ‘other normative documents’, 
all of which may be issued by government agencies to implement law or 
policy. although ‘agencies frequently rely on such interpretations … and other 
normative documents as the basis for specific administrative actions’, the sPC 
states they are not ‘formal sources of law, and do not have the binding force 
of legal norms’.33 nonetheless, if a court, when adjudicating a case relating 
to specific administrative actions, determines that such interpretation or 
normative document possesses ‘legal validity, effectiveness, reasonableness 
and appropriateness’, it may give effect to such interpretation or document in 
determining whether the specific administrative act has a legal basis.34
the message of the shanghai meeting minutes seems clear: government 
pronouncements with lesser authority than regulations are not legally binding, 
and will be given effect only at a court’s discretion. This message is also entirely 
consistent with the LL’s view of what has the force of law. however, as we will 
see in connection with moF and sat rulemaking practice, the impact of the 
shanghai meeting minutes on the behaviour of executive branch agencies has 
been limited. This is partly attributable to the fact that, according to the aLL, 
no suits may be brought to court against government agencies merely for the 
adoption of ‘administrative regulations, regulations, or decisions and orders 
with general binding force’.35 The sPC has interpreted such decisions and orders 
as encompassing ‘all normative documents issued by administrative agencies 
repeatedly and generally applicable to more than specific parties’.36 While the 
rule may be justifiable in connection with the adoption of formal legal rules on 
the ground that courts would have no power to provide a remedy (since they 
cannot invalidate any rules with formal legal effect), its rationale is less clear in 
relation to other government announcements.
32 Fa [2004] no 96, meeting minutes regarding the application of Legal norms in 
reviewing administrative Cases (sPC, issued 18 may 2004), s 1, para 3. 
33 Ibid, s 1.
34 Ibid.
35 aLL, art 12.
36 Fashi [2000] no 8, interpretations of Certain issues in the implementation of the 
administrative Litigation Law (sPC, published 8 march 2000 and effective 10 march 
2000), art 3. This has been widely understood as part of the aLL’s position that only 
specific administrative acts, and not ‘abstract administrative actions’, such as the issuing 
of regulations, can be causes of action under the aLL. see aLL, art 2 (a lawsuit may be 
brought against any specific administrative action by administrative agencies or personnel 
that infringes a person’s lawful rights and interests).
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III. Lawlessness in Tax Rulemaking
Unfortunately, the seemingly clear formal legal framework just described 
produces only dissonance and disorientation when applied to the field of 
Chinese taxation.37 almost all substantive tax rules in China are found in 
informal documents (‘circulars’)38 issued by the moF and/or the sat. the 
classification of these circulars for bureaucratic purposes is at once intricate 
and obscure.39 For legal purposes, however, the bottom line is that they are not 
ministerial regulations, even when they purport to be of general application. of 
course, generally applicable rules that do not have the force of law are found in 
other systems of tax administration as well.40 But their prevalence in the Chinese 
tax system represents an extreme case. this is because fundamental rules of 
tax law that are made pursuant to clear delegations of authority are regularly 
set forth in such informal circulars, as are most substantive tax rules that are 
arguably legislative in nature. regulations play a very marginal role. moreover, 
government agencies, including the moF and the sat, have frequently 
exercised their rulemaking discretion in such a way as to limit, or simply violate, 
taxpayers’ rights established under formal rules. 
A. Prescribing Fundamental Elements of Tax Law 
    Informally 
There is a fundamental institutional arrangement in Chinese tax policy making 
(which is itself not reflected in any formal legal rule) according to which matters 
of fundamental tax policy, left open by the nPC and the state Council, are to be 
37 This is not to say that the problems of lawlessness identified in this section are less severe 
in other Chinese regulatory spheres. if anything, tax agencies may have adhered more 
strictly to rulemaking protocols than many other agencies. 
38 as a result of general confusion about the legal and bureaucratic status of various types 
of informal documents, taxpayers and practitioners often refer to such documents in 
Chinese as ‘document no __’ (haowen) in specific contexts, the english counterpart 
to which is ‘Circular no __’. in more technical usage discussed in Pt V below, these are 
referred to as ‘normative document’. 
39 see, for example, Guoshuifa [2004] no 132, implementation measures for the Processing 
of official documents of all tax agencies of China (‘official tax documents rules’) 
(sat, issued 9 october 2004). 
40 For a summary of the use of such rules in the United states, see Kristin e hickman, ‘irB 
Guidance: The no man’s Land of tax Code interpretation’ (2009) Mich St L Rev 239.
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41 The arrangement dates back to the mid-1990s. The most recent statements regarding it 
can be found in two state Council internal management documents. see Guobanfa [2008] 
no 65, Provisions on the main Functions, internal Bodies and staffing of the ministry 
of Finance (state Council General office, issued 10 July 2009), s 5(2); Guobanfa [2008] 
no 87, Provisions on the main Functions, internal Bodies and staffing of the state 
administration of taxation (state Council General office, 10 July 2009), ss 2(1) and 
5(1).
42 enterprise income tax Law (nPC, adopted 16 march 2007, effective 1 January 2008).
43 Ibid, art 20. 
44 state Council decree no 512 (effective 1 January 2008).
45 the LL itself is silent on how the nPC and state Council should delegate authority 
within the scope of statutes.
46 most of China’s taxes are still governed by state Council regulations and not by statutes. 
The two exceptions are the eit and personal income tax.
governed by rules jointly issued by the moF and the sat.41 This arrangement is 
implicitly acknowledged by many specific statutes and regulations. For example, 
the enterprise income tax Law (‘eit Law’)42 directly delegates the authority to 
determine the ‘specific scope and criteria of income and deductions’ to the moF 
and the sat.43 the enterprise income tax Law implementation regulations 
(eitLir),44 a state Council regulation, delegates the authority to make more 
specific rules to the moF and the sat no less than 29 times. in almost all of 
these instances, the power delegated is clearly legislative in nature; the moF and 
the sat are expected not merely to interpret law but to prescribe rules that are 
missing. none of these instances of delegation for purposes of the eit specifies 
whether the two agencies are to exercise their delegated authority through 
regulations or other means.45 in practice, the two agencies have exercised such 
authority solely through the issuance of informal rules. indeed, the only joint 
regulations ever issued by the moF and the sat appear to be for taxes for 
which no statutes (and only state Council regulations) have been adopted.46 
and in these cases, there is often only one joint moF/sat regulation for each 
tax. any remaining jointly issued rules have taken non-regulation form. 
The moF and the sat thus appear to take the stance that for fundamental 
tax policy matters, there is no need to advance rules in forms recognised by the 
LL. in doing so, the two agencies have not simply disregarded legal niceties. 
informal rules without legal effect lack the core features of formal legal rules: 
non-retroactivity, being subject to public input, robust bureaucratic approval 
procedure and possibilities of non-judicial challenge. This means that informal 
rules can be seriously adverse to taxpayers. Three examples from the last two 
years in the eit area illustrate the point.
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First, the eitLir provides that asset transfers carried out in enterprise 
reorganisations are taxable unless otherwise provided by the moF and the 
sat, thus fully delegating to the two agencies the authority to determine which 
reorganisations may be eligible for deferral treatment.47 the agencies issued 
rules pursuant to such a delegation at the end of april of 2009, but made them 
retrospective to 1 January 2008 (the effective date of the eit Law).48 The draft 
rules underwent significant changes during a long drafting process in 2008 
and 2009 that was closed to the public,49 and the product was substantially 
different from previously applicable rules. no taxpayer could have anticipated 
which reorganisations would be eligible for deferral treatment and under what 
conditions. the retroactivity of the finally adopted rules means that the tax 
treatment of reorganisations between January 2008 and april 2009 was largely 
an arbitrary matter, since no one knew what actions to take to achieve deferral 
treatment. 
second, rules on foreign tax credits (FtC) were issued at the end of 2009 
but made retroactive to 1 January 2008.50 These rules specified, for the first time 
and pursuant to delegated authority,51 an indirect FtC regime, the workings 
of which taxpayers could not have anticipated. They also limited, without any 
statutory basis, the ability of a Chinese enterprise to offset the losses of one 
foreign branch against income generated from other foreign countries. not 
only has taxpayers’ statutory right to deduct losses as actually incurred52 been 
restricted, it has been restricted in a retroactive fashion. 
a third, and quite poignant, example of such informal but legislative, 
retroactive and taxpayer-adverse rulemaking relates to two moF/sat notices 
regarding non-profit organisations (nPos), which were issued in november 
47 eitLir, art 75. 
48 Caishui [2009] no 59, notice regarding several issues in the enterprise income tax 
treatment of enterprise restructuring (moF and sat, issued 30 april 2009, effective 1 
January 2008). 
49 see Wei Cui, ‘reflections on the making of the income tax rules for enterprise 
reorganizations’ (in Chinese), in xiong Wei (ed), Commentaries on Tax Caselaw and 
Interpretation, Vol 1 (Law Press, 2010), pp 123-37.
50 see Caishui [2009] no 125, notice on Foreign tax Credit issues for the enterprise 
income tax (moF and sat, 25 december 2009).
51 eitLir, art 80 provided that the meaning of indirect control for purposes of the 
indirect FtC rules is to be specified by the moF and the sat.
52 eit Law, art 8.
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2009 and again made effective on 1 January 2008.53 Under the eit Law, nPos 
are taxpayers, but qualified income of nPos may be tax-exempt.54 The eitLir 
provides that the exemption depends on the nature of both the income and the 
organisation. it specifies eligibility criteria for nPos that may claim exemption 
on qualified income and delegates to the moF and the sat the authority for 
prescribing procedures for determining eligibility of specific nPos.55 Further, 
it provides that exempt income received by qualifying nPos does not include 
income derived from for-profit activities, unless the moF and the sat prescribe 
otherwise.56 For almost two years after the eit Law took effect, no action was 
taken pursuant to these two instances of delegation, with the consequence that 
no nPo knew for sure whether they might be able to claim exemption and, if 
so, for what types of income. When the two agencies did offer such guidance, 
the notice that was supposed to have merely laid out procedural rules for the 
recognition of nPos57 imposed further substantive requirements. the other 
notice,58 instead of laying out what income derived in for-profit activities may be 
exempt, limited the scope of exempt income, even for what is derived from non-
profit activities. 
in december 2009, nine prominent foundations publicised letters submitted 
to the state Council, the sat, and the moF, requesting each government 
entity to review the legality of the two notices.59 The foundation letters alleged 
that the moF and the sat failed to consult other agencies as required by 
the eitLir, with the result that some provisions are ‘impractical’ in light 
of present circumstances of nPos. moreover, the letters highlighted that all 
income derived in non-profit activities should be exempt under the eitLir, 
contrary to the limitations set by the moF and the sat.60 subsequently, 15 
other foundations also signed the petition letter to the state Council.61 so far, 
53 Caishui [2009] no 122, notice regarding income exempt from the eit of non-Profit 
organizations (moF and sat, 11 november 2009) and Caishui [2009] no 123, notice 
regarding administrative issues in the recognition of exempt status of non-Profit 
organizations (moF and sat, 11 november 2009).
54 eit, Law art 26.
55 eitLir, art 84.
56 eitLir, art 85.
57 Caishui [2009] no 123 (note 53 above).
58 Caishui [2009] no 122 (note 53 above).
59 see, for example, http://www.naradafoundation.org/sys/html/lm_1/2009-12-22/135859.
htm.
60 Further, the letters charged the agencies with failing to specify when income derived 
from for-profit activities should be exempt, as instructed by the eitLir.
61 see: http://news.cjn.cn/gn/200912/t1047449.htm. 
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there has been no official response to these petitions, as nothing imposes a legal 
obligation on the petitioned entities to respond. existing law only requires the 
state Council to review, upon request, the validity of ministerial regulations – 
not informal documents. neither has the moF or, until very recently,62 the sat, 
instituted mechanisms for reviewing the legality of informal rules. The only way 
in which such informal rules can be made subject to review is through formal 
administrative or judicial review of specific government acts that purport to have 
such rules as a ‘legal basis’. this shows how informal (however unmistakably 
legislative) documents possess some extraordinarily attractive features for 
officials. Besides allowing them to avoid the effort to solicit public input and 
strict internal bureaucratic procedures, these documents can be made retroactive 
at will, and they are not easily appealable.
B. The Marginal Role of Regulations 
as an institutional matter, rules jointly issued by the moF and the sat are 
intended to be legislative in nature and not merely interpretative. The informal 
manner in which such rules are adopted and the resulting adverse consequences 
to taxpayers illustrate that the legal disorder in Chinese tax administration starts, 
at the stage of tax policymaking. in the meantime, the sat, which is allowed 
to act on its own to implement tax policy, also issues countless substantive 
rules that are often difficult to characterise as merely interpretative. a summary 
examination of the sat’s practice will demonstrate that the anomaly of moF/
sat’s jointly issued rules is not isolated.
Between 200263 and august 2010, the sat issued 22 ministerial regulations. 
By contrast, the agency has issued informal rules of general applicability 
numbering in the hundreds each year. a cursory examination of this area is 
sufficient to justify a conclusion that the sat selection process governing 
the choice of rules to convert to a regulatory form is arbitrary. over half of 
these sat regulations govern general procedures in tax administration,64 
although many important procedural rules remain in a non-regulation form.65 
62 see discussion in Pt iV below. 
63 There were no sat ministerial regulations before 2002 due to the fact that the legal 
status of ministerial regulations was not clarified until after the adoption of the LL.
64 The bias towards procedural rules in the use of sat regulations may reflect a preference 
for greater flexibility in making substantive rules. 
65 For instance, neither procedures for annual filing of personal income tax returns nor 
treaty benefit claim procedures have been codified in regulations. 
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The remaining few substantive regulations are quite specialised. For example, 
income tax rules for debt restructuring were the subject of one regulation in 
2002, whereas such rules for all other types of reorganisations were codified in 
numerous sat circulars. regulations were used for certain Vat rules for retail 
gasoline stations and for the sale of electricity, whereas more basic Vat rules 
were scattered through myriad informal documents. The specialised nature of 
these regulations, combined with their paltry numbers, means that regulations 
play a negligible role in shaping tax law.
By far the more common formats in which sat substantive rules were 
issued are sat issuances and sat Correspondences.66 Both formats are used 
for inter-agency communications, setting out internal bureaucratic protocols, 
as well as prescribing substantive rules. sat Correspondences are issued 
more frequently than sat issuances and may exceed 1300 a year. in terms of 
interpreting tax law, one sat internal manual states that sat issuances are to 
be used to provide ‘adjustments and supplements to tax policies and methods of 
collection, as well as clarifications and interpretations for important questions in 
the implementation [of such policies and methods]’, whereas Correspondences 
are used for ‘clarifications and interpretations of ordinary questions in the 
implementation of tax policies and methods of collection’.67 nonetheless, the 
two formats are often indistinguishable. For example, the recent, notorious 
sat Circular 69868 was an sat Correspondence, as was a controversial circular 
giving local tax authorities discretion to apply a stringent test of beneficial 
ownership for treaty purposes.69
scrutiny of the official numbering of sat issuances and Correspondences 
suggests that many of them are not published, although many others are.70 The 
criteria for publication are unclear, and whether a document is published offers 
66 Based on the database www.chinalawinfo.com, there were 158 sat issuances in 2009 – 
which is close to the number of moF/sat joint issuances (167) for the same year – and 
772 sat Correspondences. 
67 official tax documents rules, art 29.
68 Guoshuihan [2009] no 698, notice on strengthening the management of enterprise 
income tax Collection on Proceeds from equity transfers by non-resident enterprises 
(‘Circular 698’) (sat, 10 december 2009), retroactively effective 1 January 2008), 
further discussed in text (accompanying notes 76-7) below.
69 Guoshuihan [2009] no 601, notice on how to interpret and determine ‘Beneficial 
owners’ in tax treaties (sat, 27 october 2009).
70 For instance, for the first six months of 2010, over 300 sat Correspondences were 
issued, of which fewer than 60 are currently publicly available; 64 sat issuances were 
adopted but only 36 are currently publicly available.
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no guide as to whether it is intended to have legal effect. There appears to be 
no process by which sat informal rules developed over time are incorporated 
into sat regulations. in the specific matters they govern, informal rules are 
not necessarily more detailed or easy to operate than regulations.71 informal 
rules and sat regulations thus do not complement each other; they are simply 
substitutes, with sat regulations being the far more rarely chosen option. 
Finally, the record of sat informal rules in being adverse to taxpayers, both 
in content (ie narrowing rights and expanding obligations relative to formal 
legal rules) and in the lack of procedural protections (eg in terms of retroactive 
applicability and the lack of non-judicial challenge procedures), is just as 
problematic as that of informal rules jointly issued by the moF and the sat. 
rather than canvassing specific examples here,72 we now consider how the sat, 
despite many Chinese tax professionals’ seeming readiness to acquiesce in the 
state of affairs just described, has recently attempted reform.
IV. The SAT’s Reformist View
it may be difficult to imagine tax authorities failing to give fundamental tax rules 
the force of law – even when they have clear delegated authority to do so – and 
prescribing rules that both lack the force of law and are inconsistent with statutes 
and higher regulations, if this would result in their policies being unenforceable 
and efforts at collecting taxes being stalled. in reality, Chinese taxpayers do not 
regularly rely on the legal system to contest government actions.73 The reason for 
this is multifaceted – indeed, there may be a vicious circle where the paucity of 
civil tax litigation leads tax advisors to advise against such litigation. Whatever 
the explanation, many believe that formal legal proceedings do not pose a 
significant constraint on informal rulemaking by the moF and the sat.74 This 
raises the question: given the extraordinary dominance of informal rulemaking, 
what relevance does the formal legal order described in Pt i have for taxation in 
China?
71 indeed, few sat informal rules have been issued to implement sat regulations.
72 an example is given in text accompanying notes (76-7) below. 
73 For an introduction to this phenomenon, see Wei Cui, ‘two Paths for developing anti-
avoidance rules in China,’ (2011) Jan/Feb Asia Pacific Tax Bulletin 42.
74 it should be noted, however, officials in charge of administrative reconsideration (ie legal 
staff at tax agencies) may hold different views, and this may explain sat reforms such as 
the promulgation of the new measures for normative documents.
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the prevalent view among the mainstream Chinese tax profession – 
including international law and accounting firms – appears to be that the LL 
has no practical relevance in the tax context. Practitioners routinely disregard 
differences in the legal effectiveness of tax rules.75 some take pride in the wisdom 
that sat circulars ‘are the law’. recently, this view was crystallised around the 
widely-discussed Circular 698.76 on its face, Circular 698, by imposing Chinese 
tax reporting obligations on non-residents who have no Chinese-source income, 
and by declaring the power on the part of the sat to disregard offshore holding 
companies and levy tax against non-residents on non-Chinese-source income, 
goes well beyond the authority of the eit Law.77 Because it has no legal basis, 
the decision not to comply with it should attract no penalties, and under Fin 48 
standards it is quite possible for foreign companies to conclude that a taxpayer 
is ‘more likely than not’ to prevail in court against government actions based on 
the circular. even so, most Chinese tax advisors seem not to regard Circular 698’s 
legal invalidity as a significant concern. instead, they now routinely recommend 
clients to comply with Circular 698’s reporting obligations. moreover, they 
have concocted elaborate advices on which holding company structures possess 
‘business purpose’ and ‘business substance’ (so that the structures would not be 
disregarded) for purposes of the circular, based on the imagined preferences of – 
or only slightly less amorphous, informal discussions with – tax officials. 
so far, the best rebuttal of this purportedly pragmatic view has come from the 
government itself. on 15 december 2009 – just five days after Circular 698 was 
finalised, and only weeks after the issuance of the moF/sat notices regarding 
nPos – the sat’s ministerial committee met and approved the new measures 
for normative documents (referred to below simply as the ‘new measures’), 
75 see, for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘treaty residents having clearer rules for 
claiming benefits under double tax treaties’ (sep 2009) issue 20 China Tax/Business News 
Flash (stating that where an sat issuance adopted in august 2009 and an sat decree 
issued in January 2009 conflict, the former prevails because it is ‘more comprehensive in 
terms of administrative procedures’; failing to note that the sat decree is a ministerial 
regulation); available at: http://www.pwc.com/ie/en/tax/assets/benefits_under_double_
tax_treaties.pdf.
76 For a few examples from a multitude of professional articles and client alerts, see: a 
W Granwell and Peng tao, ‘China targets offshore Firms’ indirect equity transfers 
of Chinese Companies’ (16 Feb 2010) Vol 10, no 29 BNA Daily Tax Report 1; and 
dongmei Qiu, ‘China’s Capital Gains taxation of nonresidents and the Legitimate Use 
of tax treaties’ (22 november 2010) Tax Notes International 593.
77 see Lawrence sussman et al, ‘China’s Controversial new disclosure rule’, Tax Analysts 
2009 Wtd 241-1, for an example of a discussion questioning the legality of Circular 
698.
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which extend the norms of the LL to rulemaking activities of tax agencies. 
These steps show that from the SAT’s own point of view, inconsistencies between 
informal rules and formal legal rules, as well as their retroactive application, are 
unacceptable and should be systematically eliminated.
The new measures, which took effect on 1 July 2010, replace a previous set 
of rules applicable to the issuance of informal rules by tax agencies lower than 
the sat,78 and differ from these previous rules in two fundamental respects. 
The new measures, but not the previous rules, take the form of a ministerial 
regulation, signalling that the new measures have both the force of law (per 
the LL) and superior effect over the informal rules (‘normative documents’) that 
they govern. moreover, the new measures, but not the previous rules, govern 
normative documents issued by the sat itself.79 since most of China’s tax policy 
and substantive tax rules are determined nationally, the extension of the new 
measures to sat informal rulemaking gives the principles embodied in the 
previous rules much greater impact.
The new measures govern ‘tax normative documents’, defined as ‘documents 
that are made and promulgated by a tax agency ... that prescribe the rights and 
obligations of taxpayers, withholding agents and other parties against whom 
tax administrative actions may be taken … and that have general binding force 
and are applicable repeatedly within the jurisdiction of the tax agency’.80 The 
definition excludes sat ministerial regulations, and thus captures all informal 
rules issued by tax agencies that ‘prescribe the rights and obligations of taxpayers 
[etc]’ generally.81 the meaning of these words is not specifically defined 
anywhere, and presumably is synonymous with having the effect of law.82 in 
any case, the new measures stipulate that any tax normative document must 
78 trial measures for normative documents. some common features between the new 
measures and the previous rules – eg in adopting a principle of non-retroactivity 
and permitting pre-enforcement challenges regarding the legality of informal rules – 
demonstrate that the sat’s concerns for rule of law norms are not new.
79 new measures for normative documents, art 2.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. 
82 in an sat guidance issued, accompanying the new measures, a distinction between 
documents laying out internal management matters and normative documents is drawn. 
see Guoshuifa [2010] no 55, notice regarding the implementation of the ‘administrative 
measures for the making of tax normative documents’ (sat, issued 10 February 2010, 
effective 1 July 2010).
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be issued in Public announcements (gonggao) format.83 Consequently, it is now 
generally possible to tell whether an informal rule is intended to have the force 
of law simply by seeing whether it is a Public announcement.84 
the new measures impose three other requirements on tax normative 
documents that are just as significant. First, such documents cannot apply 
retroactively, except for special provisions adopted ‘for the purpose of better 
protecting the rights and interests of ’ taxpayers.85 second, the adoption of 
any tax normative document must be preceded by a review procedure that 
specifically focuses on the legal basis of the proposed rule and its consistency 
with existing law.86 each draft document must be submitted for review by the 
rulemaking agency’s legal department, along with specific statements establishing 
its legal basis.87 no normative document may be issued without the sign-off of 
the legal department.88 Third, if taxpayers believe that a normative document 
is inconsistent with national or local statutes, state Council or ministerial 
regulations, or normative documents issued by higher agencies, they may apply 
for the review of such a document with the issuing agency or the tax agency at 
the next higher level.89 since this rule applies to sat normative documents, if a 
taxpayer is inclined to challenge an sat circular, he or she no longer has to wait 
for an enforcement action to occur.90
83 new measures for normative documents, art 27. sat guidance accompanying the 
new measures has stressed this requirement. see Guoshuifa [2010] no 55 (note 82 
above) (‘matters of [tax agency] internal management and matters with general binding 
effect on taxpayers should be addressed in separate documents. Where such separation 
is difficult, as long as the document relates to taxpayers’ rights and obligations, it should 
take the form of a public announcement. in the case of a response to a particular case 
involving specific matters of individual taxpayers, it need not adopt the format of a 
public announcement and may be labeled a “reply”; however, any such response that is 
to be implemented throughout the relevant jurisdiction must still adopt the form of a 
public announcement and cannot be given as a “reply”.’)
84 Circulars for purposes of internal management continue to be issued without adopting 
the Public announcement format. see, for example, Guoshuihan [2010] no 323, notice 
regarding initiating examinations of Contemporary documentation (sat, 12 July 
2010).
85 new measures for normative documents, art 13. see LL, art 84 and discussion 
accompanying notes 18-20 above. a similar principle of non-retroactivity was contained 
in the trial measures for normative documents.
86 Ibid, arts 16, 19, 20 and 22.
87 Ibid, arts 19 and 20. 
88 Ibid, art 16. 
89 Ibid, art 35.
90 The trial measures for normative documents, which did not apply to sat documents, 
contained a similar mechanism for non-judicial pre-enforcement review. 
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in respect to retroactivity and the availability of non-judicial, pre-enforcement 
review mechanisms, therefore, the new measures puts tax normative documents 
on par with formal legal rules recognised by the LL. By contrast, the new 
measures take a fairly pragmatic approach towards rulemaking by not requiring 
the solicitation of public input.91 They also refrain from imposing the onerous 
procedures for regulation-making (including making annual regulation-making 
plans and having the ministerial committee approve each proposed regulation) 
on the issuance of normative documents.
numerous other provisions of the new measures92 also promise to introduce 
substantially more clarity and transparency to tax agencies’ (especially the sat’s) 
rulemaking activities. although the new measures apparently do not apply 
to informal rules jointly issued by the moF and the sat,93 they nonetheless 
represent a striking rebuke to the prevalent view discussed at the beginning of 
this section, that is, the view that legal order does not matter in Chinese tax 
administration because the government does not care about such order and 
taxpayers are unwilling to enforce it, and that informal rules issued by the 
government should be given full weight regardless of how much these rules 
contradict law of higher authority or are inconsistent with each other. the 
unproductiveness of this cynical view is now being underscored every day, with 
the issuance of each new tax normative document by the sat and by local tax 
agencies across China pursuant to the new measures. simply by eschewing the 
worst forms of retroactivity and by being unambiguous as to its intended legal 
effect, each document issued testifies to the improvement of tax rulemaking 
already introduced by the new measures. 
V. Conclusion
The new measures do not govern normative documents issued before 1 July 
2010. it is difficult, however, not to read this abrupt contrast between the clarity 
of the new measures and the amorphousness of the prior practice as implying 
91 new measures, art 17 merely suggests that ‘the drafting department should conduct 
in-depth investigations and research, summarise practical experiences and attend to the 
opinions of all relevant parties … opinions may be solicited in writing or online, or by 
holding symposiums, discussions and hearings, etc’.
92 new measures for normative documents, art 6, for example, clearly establishes that no 
internal division of a tax agency may issue normative documents. 
93 see Li sanjiang (ed), Annotations on the Administrative Measures for Formulating 
Normative Documents in Taxation (China taxation Press, Beijing, 2010), p 7.
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a repudiation of the latter. of course, the new measures could also be read as 
challenging the doctrines of the LL, in suggesting that normative documents 
themselves may create legal rights and obligations for taxpayers. The sat has 
acknowledged that normative documents may be disregarded by courts, and that 
such documents are inferior to regulations.94 But its view is that this does not 
prevent normative documents from being part of the legal order: they simply 
exist in the lowest rank in it, and because the LL failed to regulate this part of 
the legal order, it is the task of the executive branch, including state Council 
ministries, to expand the norms of the LL to their own rulemaking activities.
in its own terms, this view could be as conceptually coherent as the LL itself. 
one might even regard it as both pragmatic and principled. after all, the LL 
itself does not draw a clear distinction between making and interpreting law, and 
is largely silent on matters of delegation of rulemaking authority to the executive 
branch (eg on what matters must be covered in ministerial regulations as 
opposed to rules of inferior status). Without even a basic framework addressing 
such issues, the LL’s implication that its rules are the exclusive sources of law may 
seem hollow. This encourages executive branch agencies to take the view that, in 
being entrusted with the implementation of law, they not only have the power 
to make law (ie making ‘detailed’ rules) but may also do so through rules that 
are not ministerial regulations. What the sat has done is to go a step further, 
and claim that because rulemaking below the regulation level is unavoidable in 
the implementation of law, such activities must be regulated in accordance with 
LL-like norms.
however, at the moment, the sat’s position as embodied in the new 
measures is rather unique and has not been adopted by other ministries. indeed, 
even the sat itself does not follow this position when pursuing joint rulemaking 
with the moF. We must therefore conclude that there are at least three starkly 
different views about what constitutes the tax legal order in China:
1. the view represented by the LL, according to which most Chinese tax rules 
lack the force of law;
2. the implicit view of many Chinese tax service providers, whereby there is no 
tax legal order and the inconsistencies among different rules are to be resolved 
by private conversation with tax officials; and
3. the view taken by the new measures, which is progressive-minded, relative 
to the current circumstances of Chinese tax administration, and which has 
yet to be noticed, examined and embraced by taxpayers, government agencies 
and scholars alike.
94 Ibid, p 11. 
